THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING 'WAR':
TERRORISM, TORTURE, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES
Joseph Runzo, Ph.D.'
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

II.

CATEGORIZING TYPES OF WAR .........................

III.

THE POTENCY OF THE TERM "WAR" . ....................

IV.

WAR VERSUS PEACE ..................................

V.
VI.

WAR AS A, FAMILY RESEMBLANCE .......................
PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYING "WAR" .. ..................

VII.

THE "WAR ON TERROR" . .............................

139
140
141
143
145
146

147

I. INTRODUCTION

As the immediate aftermath of 9-11 illustrated, war-and the threat of
war-brings people in a society closer together as they look for security. But
war also produces an underlying and deeply disturbing sense of insecurity.
Hence, one of the most important ideas to be defined for the twenty-first
century is the notion of "war." For too ready an application of the term "war"
to conflicts can bring unwanted adverse effects, whereas the reluctance to call
conflicts "wars" undermines the unity of purpose which the perspective of
warfare brings to a threatened society.
Any viable definition of warfare today must address the exigencies of the
fight against international terrorism. Now, one military response to terrorism
can be humanitarian intervention. And one military means of supporting
humanitarian intervention can be the employment of private military companies
(PMCs). Another suggested method for combating radical terrorism during
warfare is the use of torture. So how are these kinds of issues which are
prominent in the legal and public policy debates--combating terrorism, torture,
humanitarian intervention and PMCs-relevant to how we define war in the
twenty-first century?
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H. CATEGORIZING TYPES OF WAR

The great British war historian John Keegan identifies war as "collective
killing for some collective purpose."' The collective nature of the killing points
to the difference between police actions and military actions, and the collective
nature of the purpose points to the difference between the skirmishes of
adventurism and the organized violence of military operations. However, the
state of war may not involve the active implementation of killing. This is why
the long stand off between the United States and the Soviet Union (and the
allies of each) was reasonably termed the "Cold War." Moreover, there are
many different types of wars. There are state-to-state conflicts-or collections
of states versus collections of states-which are the focus of Sun Tzu's The Art
of War, Clausewitz's On War, and Western Just War Theory.2 But, for
example, there are also civil wars, such as the Russian or Chinese revolutions;
colonial wars against indigenous peoples, such as the so-called "American
Indian wars" or the British Zulu wars in South Africa3 ; and wars between states
and non-state actors, such as the Boer War. As we begin the twenty-first
century, one relatively new form of warfare not easily assimilated to the old
categories is military humanitarian intervention. And importantly for the
present discussion, there is the "war on international terrorism," a putative form
of warfare which involves non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, that transcend
state boundaries. This last form of warfare has elements of guerilla warfare but
is actually very different from inner state guerilla warfare like that during the
Boer War or the Philippine-American War in the early part of the twentieth
century.
Compounding the fundamental complexity of the term "war," we currently
face a bewildering proliferation of the use of "war" to describe a wide range of
struggles: e.g. the current "War in Iraq," "guerilla war," "religious war," the
"War on Terrorism," the "War on Cancer," the "War on Drugs," and the "War
on Poverty." A quick Google search reveals some of the current darlings of
political groups: e.g. the "Taliban War on Women," "Rupert Murdoch's War
on Journalism," the "Republican War on Science," and the "War on
Christmas." My own personal favorites are the fight for gun rights, ironically
named the "War on Guns," and best of all, the self-reflective "War on Hype."
As the last named "War on Hype" illustrates, there clearly are overblown
and misleading contemporary uses of the term "war." So it is important to keep
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in mind at least five different, though not mutually exclusive, ways to use this
potent term, listed here in descending order of strength:

1)

The act of waging military conflict against a clearly designated
enemy. Here, we would place the American Civil War, the
Philippine-American War, the two World Wars, and the Korean War.
2) The legal state produced by a declaration of war against a
designated enemy. While WWI and WWII fit this category, the
Korean War, which was designated a "police action," and the socalled 1899 "insurrection" in the Philippines do not.
3) The profession of warmaking. Prolonged warfare or the
prospect of war leads organized states and movements to institute
military training and develop a professional military class. Here we
might ask whether the training given to members of private military
companies rises to the level of the military professionalism of
warmaking.
4)

A campaign to terminate a destructive condition in society.

Struggles which fit this category are the "War on Terror," the "War
on Drugs," and the "War on Poverty."
5) strenuous struggle between competing groups. Here we have
"price wars," "culture wars," and the ineptly named "Republican War
on Science."
Category I-the act of waging military conflict-is the foundational
category from which the other uses of "war" are derivative. So while category
I is a primary use of "war," categories II and III-i.e., the legal status of war
and the profession of warmaking-derive their meaning from the more
fundamental state of actual military conflict. Category IV---campaigns to end
destructive conditions in society-is a secondary or parasitic sense of "war,"
which is not primarily military. Category V is also secondary and is the most
parasitic of the usages. Thus, when we ask the question "Are we at war?" vis6-vis the struggle against international terrorism, while this struggle clearly
rises above category V and at least fits category IV, the question is whether it
fits categories I and II. A fundamental problem with the public discussion of
the fight against international terrorism is the tendency to confuse the
attenuated senses of "war" in category IV and even V, with the robust and
fundamental sense of war in categories I and II.
II. THE POTENCY OF THE TERM "WAR"
"War" is a steamer trunk of a term, laden with complex conceptual
baggage and enormous emotional impact. Few terms rise to this emotive level:
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perhaps "death," "murder," and "evil" do so. For some, such as Helmuth von
Moltke, category I war is positive: "[e]verlasting peace is a dream, and not
even a pleasant one; and war is a necessary part of God's arrangement of the
world ... [w]ithout war, the world would deteriorate into materialism." 4
More typically, military professionals have a negative view of category I
war. As Robert E. Lee said after the Battle of Fredericksburg, "It is well that
war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."5 And speaking from the
northern side of the horrific American conflict, William Tecumseh Sherman
said in a post-war speech in 1880, "There is many a boy here today who looks
on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell."6
The very use of the term "war" to describe a struggle marshals deep
passions and potentially strong commitments. These deep passions tend to
exaggerate and prolong category I war and, as Sun Tzu observes in his Art of
War, "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited
...War is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselves
consumed by them."7 Thus it is crucial to carefully distinguish category I war
from the derivative senses of "war," so that the terrible things which are
inevitably done to human beings during warfare are not in part induced by a
tragically misleading use of this powerfulterm.
General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote a small
volume Warfighting: The U.S. Marine Corps Book of Strategy, which became
official doctrine for the Corps in 1989.8 He opens with this definition of war:
War is a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations,
characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war is a
violent clash between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable
wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.., the object of war is
to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the
organized application or threat of violence by military force. 9
This identifies many wars in the sense of category I, though I think this
pre-9/11 description needs to be expanded to include military hostilities
between or among both state and non-state actors. The object of war is to
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impose one's will; the further object of just war is imposing one's will for
peace. (As Aristotle said in an early intimation of Just War Theory, "[w]e
make war that we may live in peace.")'0
Now, General Gray goes on to point out that "disorder is an integral
characteristic of war [itself]; we can never eliminate it."" He concludes that
War is among the greatest horrors known to mankind; it should never
be romanticized ... violence is an essential element of war, and its
immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. 2
Thus, the most extreme social means of settling disputes-warfare-has
the curious property of at least suspending if not destroying the very state of
security and peace which is war's raisond'etre. It is especially important to
note in the current world situation that insecurity results from war notjust in the
land where active combat occurs, but even in the non-war-zone homeland of
distant combatants. As U.S. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has said,
"without question, the government's authority to engage in conduct that
infringes civil liberty is greatest in the time of declared war,"' 3 and this is true
whether the "declared war" is declared in the legal sense of category II or in a
more generalized declaration like the "War on Terror."
IV. WAR VERSUS PEACE

We see, then, that "war" is a contrast term, only fully explicable in the
context of the character of the intended peace. Analyzing this further, consider
the restrictive view of peace which Oliver O'Donovan presents in The Just War
Revisited.'4 He says that "the peace which any conflict aims at is still
indeterminate, known only negatively as the correctionof the grave injustice
that afforded the cause."15 But surely O'Donovan is mistaken. Achieving the
absence of war-negative peace--often simply perpetuates the unjust structures
of the society which caused war in the first place. The goal of war must be
positive peace--or what Immanuel Kant called "perpetual peace"--i.e.,
establishing the conditions for a just society. 6 In Iraq the United States does
not want to simply reproduce the relatively stable prewar Iraqi society sans
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Saddam Hussein, but rather correctly sees peace as the establishment of a new
and just social order, even if it is not entirely to the current Administration's
liking.
Consider now a too liberal construal of "war." In Leviathan, Hobbes
postulates a sort of generalized "warfare" of the human condition: "during the
time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called war; and such a war is of every man against every
man.""7 This is not particularly helpful for identifying the primary sense of the
term "war," for it does not distinguish war from other forms of human conflict.
A somewhat better understanding of war can be found in Evolution of War,
Maurice Davie's classic study after the First World War:
The struggle for existence is a process in which a group and nature
are parties . . . each group, besides struggling with nature for its
existence, has to compete with every other group with which it comes
into contact; rivalry and collision of interests appear, and when these
issue in a contest by force, we call it war. 8
That is, in order to have distinctive content, the term "war" should be used to
demarcate a state of society or a type of conflict which is markedly different
than other portions of human existence.
However, one should not think of the "state of war" as an exactly
separable unit of time from two contrasting "states of peace." For two nations
could be in a state of war without actually engaging in warfare, and warfare
might cease between two nations even when there is no legally determined
armistice, so that technically and legally the two nations are still in a state of
war, though they have ceased all warfighting. Hobbes suggests that:
As the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but
in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war
consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 9
While Hobbes' views are infelicitous for identifying war itself, he does
identify the disruptive psychological state which results from war in the sense
of category I, which is quite distinct from the legal sense of war identified in
category II.
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V. WAR AS A FAMILY RESEMBLANCE

Once we have narrowed our primary use of "war" to categories 1-111, all
of which emphasize the essential military nature of war, we still confront a
wide range of types of war. Wars may or may not involve professional armies,
may or may not involve mercenaries or PMCs, may or may not stretch over long
periods with few actual battles (such as the Punic Wars or the 100 Years War),
may or may not be recognized by international law, may or may not be
recognized by national law, may or may not be declared, may involve little
actual combat (such as the Cold War), and might not come to a clear end (such
as the Congolese Wars of the last twenty years). The cessation of war may or
may not be a goal (if not, the war is not just), war may or may not be fought as
a defensive action, war may or may not be fought to take back something stolen
(such as land), war may or may not be fought on religious grounds (such as the
First but not Fourth Crusades), and war may be limited or total. To take only
the latter dichotomy, limited wars push the boundaries of the use of the term
"war." While the U.S. is not currently at war with Iraq, is the U.S. currently "at
war" in Iraq (there was, after all, a presidential declaration that the war is over)?
Or is Japan, with its security deployment in Iraq, "at war" in Iraq? In general,
is humanitarian military action a war?
No one comprehensive set of features is definitive of all warfare in the
category I sense. However, it does not follow that there are no necessary
conditions for "war" or that there are no sufficient conditions which identify
"war." For instance, prolonged military conflict involving collective killing for
a collective purpose is a sufficient condition for "war." On the other hand, it
would seem that there are some necessary conditions for war in the primary
sense of "war." First, military force (and this may include PMCs) must be
involved either by threat or actual use. Second, soldiers must be involved, and
hence war in the sense of category III is involved. Third, the aim of the military
action must be to force a perceived enemy to conform to one's will. And
fourth, the aim must be to defeat the perceived enemy. This last condition is
important, because as soon as a conflict is designated a "war," then it becomes
possible to lose by not defeating the "enemy."
Now, given the fact that there is no definitive set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for "war," this term undoubtedly functions as a "family
resemblance." As Ludwig Wittgenstein famously explains in the Philosophical
Investigations, certain terms function as collectives, as for example, does the
term "game." 2 ° There is no one definitive set of features which identifies all
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games.2 Rather, games share "family resemblances," for just as members of
the same human family do not have the same features, two members of the
family might share one set of features while two other members share another
set of features, even as one member of each of those two pairs form another
pair, sharing other features, creating overlapping sets of shared features.22 So
too, games can have one, two, or many players, games can be physical or
mental, games can have time limits or not, and so on.23 Thus, solitaire, chess,
basketball, and cricket have a family resemblance, as species of games.24 In the
same way, civil wars and colonial wars and world wars share a family
resemblance of the species "war."
VI. PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYING "WAR"

There are at least four salient parameters for identifying "war" in a clear,
accurate and substantive primary usage. First, this term must be used in a
balanced way which avoids two extremes. On the one hand, if the term is
restricted to a narrow usage applying only to professional armies and nationstate conflicts, many contemporary conflicts, which are arguably the most
dangerous for our world, would not be treated as wars. On the other hand, if
this term is used in a virtually unrestricted sense to apply e.g., to confrontations
not primarily involving military force, then the dilution of the term will make
it impossible to construct a viable Just War Theory and impossible to articulate
viable international law to condemn, restrict and punish the unjust use of
military force.
Second, it is best to err on the side of caution in applying the term "war"
to a conflict or potential conflict since this emotionally charged term can
unleash forces of fanaticism and disregard for law. As Cicero famously
observed more than two millennia ago: laws are silent in times of war.25 Third,
another reason for caution in labeling any conflict a "war" is that once declared
wars are either won or lost. The attempt to avoid "losing a war" at all cost can
be extraordinarily destructive to a society.
Fourth, once a war is declared, far reaching governmental war powers go
into effect both explicitly and implicitly, subverting the normal mechanisms of
civilized society. As Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke argue in America
Alone: The Neo-conservativesand the Global Order:
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Neo-conservatives argued-and continue to argue-that military
force is the preferred option responding to foreign challenges. The
neo-conservatives for have actively encouraged the interpretation of
counterterrorism as a war, which mobilizes all national resources and
legitimizes all available means.26

In times of war, the populous rightly places immediate self-preservation
over more nuanced approaches to security. Procedures like torture, which
would normally not be contemplated, are seriously contemplated in public.
People are incarcerated without trial; businesses are forced to change their
trading partners; their merchandising, and even their products; mothers and
fathers willingly give up their sons and daughters to the machinery of death
and; most crucially, others who were once perceived as fellow human beings
often become denigrated as sub-human, through the process I call
"verminification," which has extraordinarily adverse affects on any eventual

peace. Since "war" is importantly defined in terms of the intended peace, the
effect on peace of the methods of warfare should be calculated into what one
is willing to designate a "war."
VII. THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Turning now to the "War on Terror," this is clearly a war in sense IV,
though it is sometimes erroneously characterized as a "clash of cultures" and
thus further categorized as a "war" in sense V. The putative "War on Terror"
is not like typical wars in category I because Western societies are not in fact
generally mobilized against the enemy and the "war" does not require an
acknowledged general sacrifice from society. The question of whether the
"War on Terror" fits category II is a question about the legal status of this
"war." And the extent to which it fits category IH, the science of warmaking,
is in part determined by the degree of military professionalism of the large
numbers of PMC personnel which are engaged.
There are many threats against any modern society-threats to economic
well-being, threats to cultural well-being, threats to security-but only the
gravest and most specific threats to peace itself justifiably call forth the
collective killing for collective purpose which is the horror of war. Generalized
threats of competition, of cultural erosion, or erosion of security, do not merit
the grave social burden of war. General calls to "fight against terrorism" are
not legitimate calls to war, though the struggle against a specific terrorist
system or network which can be identified, and against which there is some
reasonable hope of success, may merit a war response. The general so-called
26.
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"War on Terror" is a counter-terrorism struggle. Like the "War on Drugs," it
is a struggle against a heartless, murderous enemy. International drug lords and
their weapons of cocaine, heroin, etc., have much the same deleterious effects
on society as terrorists with their bombs and guns. The struggle against these
two enemies is not a war in the primary sense of category I, for neither is
principally military.
One way to see this distinction is to step outside the super-heated
American context and look at the struggles of another country. Israel is
constantly struggling with terrorism. Israel has also fought several distinct and
notable wars. It is valuable both conceptually and practically for Israel to be
able to distinguish between the two forms of conflict. Israel's overall counterterrorism struggle is not a war in the category I sense.27 The distinguishable Six
Days' War, the Yom Kippur War, and the recent incursion into southern
Lebanon are category I wars. Similarly, the initial 2003 second war with Iraq
was a category I war, while the overall counter-terrorism struggle against AlQaeda is a war in the derivative sense of category IV.
In political society, the quest for truth is always too easily set aside in the
quest for rhetorical effect, and whenever this happens, it can be a dangerous
time for a nation. In our country, every time the current Administration
declares that the nation is at war, and every time the media blithely puts the
words "War on Terror" on the nation's television screens, the deep fears,
animosities and even hatred which this term can illicit are tapped. Importantly,
this also posits a war which can be won or lost, rather than a struggle with
degrees of success. It is worth keeping in mind Sun Tzu's admonition some
2500 years ago: "War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark
upon it without due reflection. ,28
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